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Dealing with European integration is nothing new for the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office (FCO). For the past 60 years it has, like British government in general, shown both 
enthusiasm and suspicion for developments on the continent whether they were in the 
shape of the original European Coal and Steel Community or the latest proposals for a 
European constitution. Such a long and close involvement has inevitably had an impact 
upon the way the FCO operates, the way it sees the world, and how others perceive and 
work with it. This study of the FCO will concentrate mainly upon the impact of 
Europeanisation on the FCO and its changing role in UK policy-making and 
implementation, rather than on UK politics or British foreign policy. It sets out to explore 
to what extent we can say the FCO has been ‘Europeanised’, and through which 
processes this has occurred.  
Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan
1 have defined Europeanisation as ‘the reorientation 
or reshaping of aspects of politics in the domestic arena in ways that reflect the policies, 
practices and preferences of European level actors, as advanced through the EU 
initiatives and decisions.’ When applying such a definition to the FCO we must take note 
of how it is influenced by changing domestic societal and constitutional arrangements, in 
addition to transformations in the international and European system such as Britain’s 
relative decline as a world power since 1945. When faced with such a context we must 
view the FCO through the lenses of domestic, European and international issues. It is also 
important to recall that the FCO is not a department confined to London but a complex 
system of overseas posts and diplomatic processes, which produce a diverse collection of 
outlooks and concerns, and which we must also assess for Europeanisation.    
This paper will begin by examining the history of the FCO reflecting upon its 
interactions with European integration, highlighting that this has been only one of several 
key challenges for the FCO over the last 60 years. The paper will then move onto explore 
the setup of the FCO and how it operates today. The current structure of the FCO reflects 
a cumulative adjustment to change over a considerable period of time, although the pace 
of this change has quickened since Britain became a member of the EU. As the   2
government department responsible for Britain’s external relations it has invested 
considerable resources and energy into Britain’s relations with its European partners, 
although this has not always been to good affect. Its position within Whitehall and British 
government has been both enhanced and challenged by European integration. Indeed, as 
we will show, for the FCO European integration is something from which it has neither 
gained nor lost. This in turn returns us to the key difficulty of the wide variety of 
pressures to which the FCO has been subject, which we explore in some detail. These 
include international issues and domestic challenges such as constitutional reform, 
societal changes, new trends in management and institutional structuring, and the style of 
leadership adopted by Foreign Secretaries and Prime Ministers, the latter of which will be 
discussed towards the end of the paper.  
  The paper will highlight several issues. First, that the FCO has neither won 
nor lost from European integration; but that it has experienced something of a relative 
decline in control over European policy making. Second, that the patterns of adaptation 
shown by the FCO have been in line with the wider patterns of adaptation shown 
throughout Whitehall, in that change has been kept to a minimum with the key approach 
being adaptation of existing procedures. Third, as highlighted above, the FCO has been 
subject to a wide variety of pressures and Europeanisation must be seen as just one of 
many. Fourth, the development of European Political Cooperation (EPC) and now the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has given the FCO an area over which it 
alone has expertise. Fifth, that there remains a considerable amount of bi-lateral work that 
has an influence upon EU activity, especially in the area of CFSP. Finally, foreign 
ministries and national diplomatic services face a general problem of losing control over 
international relations between sub-national authorities and domestic departments. 
Similarly the blurring of boundaries between the domestic and the foreign presents a 
formidable challenge to national foreign ministries which is highlighted and emphasized 
by EU membership but by no means limited to it. UKREP is an exceptional external 
representation but its role as a kind of mini-Whitehall is to be found to a lesser extent in a 
number of UK embassies abroad and not just in those in other EU member states. 
However, we should be careful to avoid dismissing the influence of Foreign Ministries 
which remain strong and resource rich environments.    3
It is worth noting that the difficulty of identifying the causes of change in this area 
are nicely illustrated by the recent publication of two similar volumes. In Foreign 
Ministries: Change and Adaptation (Macmillan 1999) Brian Hocking has edited a book 
of contributions that examines  changes in  a selection of foreign ministries and 
diplomatic services drawn from all corners of the world. The introduction and 
conclusions seek to generalise about the impact of globalization and interdependence on 
diplomatic organisations and procedures. In European Foreign Ministries: Integrating 
Diplomats (Palgrave 2002) the same editor Brian Hocking (with David Spence) has 
produced a similar volume, this time limited to the foreign ministries of the EU member 
states, which has as its implicit focus the Europeanisation of EU member state foreign 
ministries. It is thus hard to be clear about the extent to which significant changes in the 
FCO are related specifically to EU membership or more generally to changes either to 
national circumstance or the broader international context.  
  
History and development of the FCO 
 
The history and role of the Foreign Office in the making and implementation of British 
foreign policy has been told in a number of places
2 and needs only a brief rehearsal here. 
The Foreign Service can be traced back to 1479 and the Foreign Office to 1782. Until the 
mid-1960s the UK chose to handle its imperial and post imperial relationships separately 
from its dealings with the rest of the world. The Colonial Office, the India Office, the 
Dominions Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office have all evolved and merged 
over time to form the Commonwealth Office and, in 1968, the Foreign Office and the 
Commonwealth Office themselves merged to form the present FCO.  The present 
Diplomatic Service was established in 1965 amalgamating the Foreign Service, the 
Commonwealth Service and the Trade Commission Service
3. 
The administration of British aid has a complex history of semi-detachment from 
the FCO. Overseas aid was traditionally administered by the Foreign Office but in 1964 
the Labour Government created a separate Ministry of Overseas Development headed by 
a Cabinet minister. Since then Conservative governments (1970-1974 and 1979–1997) 
have chosen to handle aid through an Overseas Development Administration (ODA)   4
under the overall control of the FCO whilst Labour governments (1964-1970 and 1974-
1979) preferred a separate Ministry. In 1997 the incoming Labour government 
maintained this pattern by establishing a Department for International Development 
headed by Claire Short ( now replaced by Hilary Benn) with a seat in the Cabinet. This 
paper will therefore not explore the idea of any Europeansiation of UK development 
policy.  
The Foreign Office and now the FCO have always had a central role in the 
management of Britain’s external policies. This role has been challenged by the relative 
decline of Britain’s position and role in the international system throughout the twentieth 
century (most spectacularly since 1945) and by the changing nature of international 
relations  - the shifting agenda, the changing basis of power and influence and the growth 
of interdependence and of multilateral attempts to manage that interdependence.  Despite 
these trends, which have tended to blur the distinction between foreign and domestic 
politics and policy, the FCO has managed to retain a central role in the shaping and 
management of Britain’s external policies. The most significant example of Britain’s 
involvement in multilateral management is, of course, its membership of the European 
Union that has both challenged and, in many ways, enhanced the role of the FCO.
4 The 
continued strength and high reputation of the FCO has, in recent years, played a major 
part in enabling Britain to ‘punch above its weight’ in the international system in general. 
Faced with the contradictory pressures of changing demands and diminishing resources, 
the FCO has firmly resisted ‘external’ attempts to reform it (see below) whilst 
demonstrating an effective willingness and ability to make the necessary internal 
adaptations. It is a measure of the FCO’s adaptive ability that the Diplomatic Service has 
successfully retained its separate and unique status within the British administration and 
that successive Foreign Secretaries have preserved their senior position within the British 
Cabinet hierarchy. The position of Foreign Secretary remains one of the most important 
posts in the British government although the particular importance of the relationship 
between Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary has been modified in recent years by the 
growing power of the Prime Minister’s office in Downing Street
5. This can in part be 
attributed to the impact of Britain’s membership of the EU, the increasing demands on 
Foreign Ministers, and the external policy leadership and coordinating role that the   5
expansion of the power of the European Council has given to the head of the government 
and his office. We will return to this subject a little later.  
The general expansion in the number of states in the international system has 
challenged the FCO’s determination to preserve Britain’s global power status by 
retaining a global representation. This FCO managed to do this in response to the 
proliferation of states as a result of decolonisation in the 1960s and 1970s; the new 
challenges posed by the emergence of new states following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and of Yugoslavia in the 1990s have proved more testing and the FCO has 
struggled to keep up with its major European rivals.
6 In 2003 Britain maintained 233 
posts of which 153 are embassies (compared with just 136 countries in 1968) whilst 
Germany maintained 208 posts and France 279 posts 
7. In April 1999 the FCO had a total 
of 5635 UK-based staff of whom 2295 were serving overseas (whilst Germany had 3361 
and France 5669 staff serving overseas)
8 although these figures partly reflect a continuing 
British tradition of, and preference for, employing quite high numbers of local staff in its 
missions abroad. The rapid expansion of tourism and travel along with an increase in the 
number of states has increased certain of the demands on overseas posts whilst the 
increased ease and speed of both travel and communications has raised contradictory 
doubts about the purpose of, and need for, overseas posts
9. These and other issues 
relating to both change and Britain’s declining resources have meant that the FCO has 




12 Reports in 1964, 1969 and 1977 (see below) respectively all made 
recommendations which the FCO was inclined to resist. More recently the 1992 
Structural Review, the 1995 Fundamental Expenditure Review, the 1996 Senior 
Management Review, and the work that led to the recently published FCO Strategy 
Document were all conducted ‘in house’, albeit with the participation of outside 
consultants, and produced recommendations that the FCO was more inclined to accept. 
The latter reviews were partly occasioned by a self-perceived need to rethink certain 
aspects of the FCO’s work (its staffing policies in the face of demands for racial and 
sexual equality of opportunity and for more rapid career advancement in a Diplomatic 
Service that had become ‘top-heavy’ as a result of various administrative reorganisations; 
its postings policies as more FCO spouses were reluctant to sacrifice their own careers in   6
order to accompany FCO staff abroad and its staff training and development policies as 
the demands for functional expertise increased) partly by the need to find further 
financial savings and partly by the general trend of  governmental reform (Thatcherite 
market testing, financial devolution, delayering, performance targeting and analysis etc.) 
which had developed in recent years. 
During Mrs Thatcher’s period in office, the FCO was subjected to a continuous 
level of criticism by a dominant Prime Minister who became increasingly interested, as 
all long-serving prime ministers tend to, in playing a major role in foreign affairs
13.  Mrs 
Thatcher’s frustration and problems with the European Union, which she associated with 
the pro-European leanings of the FCO, led her to contemplate, but in fact never to 
seriously implement, the possibility of building up Downing Street’s foreign policy 
capabilities as a counter to the central role of the FCO. In Charles Powell, a debonair 
career FCO official, who became increasingly politicised during his time at No.10, Mrs 
Thatcher had an ambitious and effective Private Secretary for Overseas Affairs who was 
more than capable of assisting her in her occasional forays against the FCO – his part in 
the drafting of her attack on the EU and its President, Jacques Delors, in a speech made at 
the College of Europe in 1988 is a case in point
14. Mrs Thatcher also appointed a 
succession of ex-ambassadors to advise her but, by and large, they were always careful 
not to undermine their previous employers when briefing her. Under Mrs Thatcher, plans 
for the establishment of a Foreign Affairs Unit along similar lines to the American 
National Security Council
15were overtaken by the events that led to her eventual 
resignation. John Major showed no real inclination to side-step either the Foreign 
Secretary or the FCO in the handling of foreign policy in general or the EU specifically. 
In April 1998 Mr Blair rejected proposals put forward by some of his colleagues for 
creating a powerful Prime Minister’s Department based upon a reconstructed Cabinet 
Office.
16 However there was a small controversy over the revelation that the Prime 
Minister had appointed several overseas personal envoys ( Lords Levy, Paul and Ahmed). 
Press comment saw these appointments as indicative of ‘an American style of foreign 
policy’
17 and noted the fact that these envoys were unaccountable to parliament and could 
be seen to be part of a process that by-passed the FCO. When Mr Blair was returned to 
office in 2001 however he did take significant steps to enhance the role of Downing   7
Street over both EU policy and foreign policy towards the rest of the world. Mr Blair 
chose to move two of the Cabinet Office Secretariats (dealing with Overseas and Security 
policy and with the EU) into Downing Street under the control of his two foreign policy 
advisors – Sir Stpehen Wall (ex head of UKREP) and Sir David Manning (ex head of the 
UK Delegation to NATO). We will return to this a little later. 
The FCO is staffed largely by members of the Diplomatic Service but with some 
members of the Home Civil Service. The Diplomatic Service is staffed by around 6000 
UK-based personnel (around 4000 in the Diplomatic Service and 2000 Home Civil 
Servants mainly in support roles in London) who serve both at home and abroad. In 2003 
there were around 2295 UK-based staff serving abroad and they were assisted in posts by 
7841 locally engaged staff
18. The FCO have been forced to accept considerable 
reductions in budgets and overall staffing levels (21% since 1980) in recent years. The 
FCO vote (minus the variable costs of peacekeeping operations) is around £1 billion at 
1995 prices. The FCO thus has a relatively small budget in contrast to the £20+ billion  
allocated to the Ministry of Defence or the nearly £100 billion expenditure of the 
Department of Social Security. The FCO has hardly any programme expenditure (unlike 
the DFID) and so budget cuts can be directly translated into staff slots or overseas posts.
19 
As a consequence FCO morale has been quite badly affected in recent years by the 
constant budgetary pressures.  Staff who have become disillusioned, either by budget 
reductions, seemingly inconsiderate postings policies or the lack of opportunity for career 
advancement have been able to find better paid and often less demanding employment in 
the private sector and, for some, in the European Union. 
 
The FCO under review: 
 
As noted above, the FCO has been the subject of a number of formal inquiries in recent 
years. The Plowden Report delivered in 1964 ‘provoked the most radical changes and the 
least controversy’.
20 It was responsible both for the creation of the unified diplomatic 
service and for the eventual amalgamations that led to the establishment of the FCO. 
Despite the obvious decline in British global influence that was apparent by the mid 
1960s the Plowden report was  ‘friendly’ towards the FCO in its assumption that Britain   8
should nevertheless maintain the foreign policy capability of a global power. To this end, 
Plowden recommended improved conditions of employment for the diplomatic service 
which it felt should be maintained at a level approximately 10% above basic 
requirements so as to allow for enhanced training, leave and travel. These proposals were 
never implemented and subsequent inquiries were never so generous in their 
recommendations. 
In 1969, after the traumas of devaluation and the military withdrawal from east of 
Suez, the Duncan Report 
21 was much tougher on the FCO. It set out to achieve savings 
of between 5 and 10 per cent by distinguishing between two distinct areas of British 
attention. Duncan recommended that the countries of western Europe plus North America 
should be grouped together in an Area of Concentration whilst the rest of the world 
(including Japan and the whole of the Middle East!) would form an Outer Area.  
Countries within the Area of Concentration and one or two other ‘special cases’ would be 
served by Comprehensive Posts, which would be staffed in the traditional way, but most 
of the countries that fell within the Outer Area would be served by much reduced 
Selective Posts from which there would be virtually no political reporting.. The main 
emphasis of diplomacy was to be on commercial work and the Duncan Report made it 
clear that it did not consider a foreign policy apparatus suitable for a global power with 
comprehensive political and commercial interests any longer appropriate for Britain. This 
view of the role of the FCO and the Diplomatic Service was of course strongly contested 
by the FCO, whose delaying tactics were all that were required as the change of 
government that occurred in June of 1970 led to the shelving of the Duncan Report. 
Even more radical however was the report produced by the Central Policy Review 
Staff (CPRS) under Kenneth Berrill.
22 Charged with recommending ‘the most suitable, 
effective and economic means of representing and promoting British interests both at 
home and overseas’ the CPSR team came up with a proposal that the Diplomatic Service 
and the Home Civil Service be effectively merged creating a Foreign Policy Group. This 
suggestion was based on the assumption that the necessary specialisms required to   
advance British interests were to be found in the Home Civil Service and that the 
essentially political advice, expensively provided by the Diplomatic Service, was no 
longer relevant to British needs. Were this advice to be made today it would almost   9
certainly be regarded as an indicator of europeanization. In addition, the CPRS Report 
called for the closing of 55 posts on top of the 30 that had been closed since Duncan 
reported.  The CPRS Report was nothing more than a direct attack on the FCO and all 
that it stood for and it provoked an enormously hostile response. Typical was the reaction 
of one of Britain’s senior Ambassadors whose Paris embassy was singled out for 
particular attack for the ‘lavishness’ of its hospitality. In his diaries, Sir Nicholas 
Henderson records ‘This is the third such enquiry in the past fifteen years. True, Plowden 
and Val Duncan did the service no harm but the setting up of yet another and outwardly 
more hostile enquiry has not been good for morale’
23 The FCO produced a line by line 
rebuttal of the entire report and they were supported in their endeavors by  Jim Callaghan, 
the Prime Minister, who had fond memories of his time as Foreign Secretary
24. The 
CPRS Report provoked such a hostile reaction, with hundreds of serving diplomats 
threatening to resign rather than face incorporation into the Home Civil Service, that it 
probably never stood much chance of being implemented. Despite its spirited and 
successful defence, the FCO showed in later years that it recognised some of the 
problems highlighted by the CPRS Report, even if it rejected the proposed solutions. 
More recently, the FCO has been given a more searching examination by the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, particularly over its response to 
new commercial challenges in the Far East and over its management of Public 
Diplomacy via the BBC World Service and the British Council (both of whom are FCO 
responsibilities and paid for under the FCO vote). In the 1990s the FCO has responded to 
the general climate of government reform by holding its own internal Structural Review 
in 1992, a Fundamental Expenditure Review (FER) in 1995 and a Senior Management 
Review (SMR) in 1996. The acceptance and implementation of these more recent reports 
are part of the FCO’s response to a changing European and international environment 
although it is hard to distinguish between the two or to isolate influences which are 
specifically European or EU. In 2004 the FCO published its own Strategy Document; the 
product of consultation both within and beyond Whitehall.  
 
Structure of the FCO 
   10
The FCO is headed by the Foreign Secretary who is always a senior member of the 
Government. There are usually at least three junior ministers (four when ODA is situated 
within the FCO) one of whom, in recent years has been designated Minister for Europe. 
The FCO is headed by a Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) who is responsible both for 
the administration of the FCO and the work of overseas posts through a Board of 
Management and for strategic policy advice to ministers through a Policy Advisory 
Board. In recent years the work of the PUS has become increasingly focussed on the 
management of the FCO in London. The post of Political Director, which was initially 
created so that Britain could willingly play its part in the EU’s system of European 
Political Cooperation, is now effectively the top policy advisory post. Whereas twenty 
years ago the PUS would always accompany the Foreign Secretary or Prime Minister on 
his travels overseas now it is usually the Political Director who clocks up the air miles 
whilst the PUS stays at home to look after the shop. The specific position of Political 
Director can be explained in terms of Europeanisation, in particular a form of voluntary –
direct Europeanisation in that the FCO willingly adapted to take advantage of EPC and 
this adaptation has led to spillover whereby the Political Director now plays a larger role 
than perhaps originally intended. However, the different roles played by the PUS and 
Political Director are the result of both EU membership and other factors, especially the 
need for improved management within the FCO. 
The basic FCO unit remains the geographical desk within a geographical 
Department and Command. Although there has been a considerable growth in functional 
departments in response to the ‘internationalisation’ and ‘Europeanisation’ of a number 
of traditional domestic issues and to the growth of multilateral forums, the FCO has 
resisted suggestions that, as a multi-functional organisation, it should reorganize itself 
around its functions although in the case of EU membership this is now changing. The 
Fundamental Expenditure Review of 1995 argued for the preservation of a structure 
based on regional and multilateral organisation partly because of the high estimated cost 
of restructuring the FCO and partly because of the continuing logic of geographical 
specialisation. The FCO believes that it’s knowledge of specific countries and its 
development of bilateral relationships that span across a number of specific functions, 
adds significant value to the advancement and coordination of British interests. If the   11
FCO were to be reorganised along functional lines then the fear would be that a number 
of functions could then be ‘hived off’ to domestic ministries along the lines suggested by 
the 1977 CPRS Report. In January 2000, shortly before he became Minister for Energy in 
the reshuffle that followed the resignation of Peter Mandelson, Peter Hain, then a Foreign 
Office Minister, published a pamphlet
25 in which he advocated the scrapping of 
Departments based on geographical divisions in favour of ‘issues’ departments dealing 
with subjects such as human rights, the environment and conflict prevention.
26 To the 
extent that the ‘desks’ for other EU member states have recently been removed from a 
geographical command and placed within functional (EU) departments (more below) 
then Hain’s proposals seem to be gaining acceptance at least as far as the management of 
European multilateral and bilateral policies are concerned.    12
    Within the FCO, the problems raised by the proliferation of functional and 
multilateral commands cutting across the geographical divisions is best illustrated by 
reference to arrangements for dealing with the countries of Western Europe and the EU. 
Across Whitehall the coordination of British foreign policy is not in the exclusive control 
of the FCO. Long gone are the days when all contacts with the outside world were 
handled by the FCO acting as some form of ‘gatekeeper’. Today just as the FCO has 
sprouted a number of functional departments that in many ways ‘shadow’ the work of 
Home Departments so, in turn, most Home Departments have developed their own 
international and European sections (however, they rarely in turn shadow the FCO!). The 
FCO continues to play a major role in the coordination of all these different aspects of 
Britain’s external policy but the British system also recognises that, with reference to a 
number of cross-cutting issues, the FCO is not the unchallenged sole determinant of the 
overall British interest but merely an ‘interested’ department amongst many others. In 
these cases, the Cabinet system and the work of the Cabinet Office provide consistency 
and coherence. At the very top of the decision-making process, the British Cabinet is 
meant to be collegial and the doctrine of collective responsibility pertains
27. In practice 
many decisions are delegated down to Cabinet Committees of which the Committee on 
Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) and the Committee on the Intelligence Services both 
chaired by the Prime Minister and the Sub-Committee on European Questions ((E)DOP), 
chaired by the Foreign Secretary, are the most important in relation to foreign policy.
28 
The work of these ministerial committees and of their official counterparts is 
supported by the Cabinet Office, headed by the Secretary of the Cabinet who is also the 
head of the Home Civil Service. There were five separate Secretariats within the Cabinet 
Office of which three (the Overseas and Defence Secretariat, the Joint Intelligence 
Secretariat and the European Secretariat) had external relations coordination 
responsibilities
29. Two of these Overseas and Defence and Europe have now been moved 
from the Cabinet Office to the Prime Ministers Office in Downing Street. The 
Secretariats are quite small, staffed mainly by home civil servants but also by members of 
the diplomatic service. The relationship between the FCO and the staff of the relevant 
secretariats is a close one; in no sense are they rivals although on issues where the FCO is   13
in dispute with other government departments it is the Secretariat staff who record the 
minutes of the meetings at which government policy is thrashed out. 
 
The FCO and today’s challenges 
 
In recent years the FCO has faced a number of specific issues in addition to the general 
problem of managing the consequences of Britain’s relative decline in the international 
hierarchy. The biggest external challenge has arisen from the need to adjust both the 
procedures and substance of British foreign policy to the growing importance of the 
European Union. Participation in the European Union has given particular emphasis to 
the blurring of the boundaries between domestic and foreign policy. A considerable 
amount of EU business is conducted by officials from the Home Civil Service working in 
domestic ministries such as the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and the 
Department for the Environment, Food and Agriculture (DEFRA). Where once most 
dealings with foreign governments were conducted through the FCO and Britain’s 
embassies abroad, now there are direct dealings between domestic ministries and their 
opposite numbers in the other EU member states
30. This has highlighted a number of 
issues of both coordination and control
31 that have challenged the FCO’s dominant role in 
the identification and pursuit of British interests overseas.  
In the past a separate European Ministry has been proposed and, under Edward 
Heath in the 1970-74 Conservative administration, a Cabinet minister with EU 
responsibilities (Geoffrey Rippon) was appointed to support the Foreign Secretary, 
although, once the accession negotiations were completed, the post was soon abolished. 
The FCO has always resisted attempts to separate EU business from the overall 
responsibilities of the FCO and successive Foreign Secretaries have shown little 
enthusiasm for suggestions that the present Minister of State for Europe be elevated to 
Cabinet rank. A Foreign Secretary stripped of his EU responsibilities and prerogatives 
would suffer an enormous loss of political stature so central is the EU to so many internal 
and external policy issues. Furthermore, removing the EU from the UK department of 
state responsible for external affairs would also represent a major political and symbolic 
change that would touch the nerve of national sovereignty. Nevertheless the idea was   14
raised again
32 and was discussed also at the Convention on the Future of Europe with the 
suggestion that senior cabinet ministers (Jacques Delors even suggested Deputy Prime 
Ministers!) reporting directly to Prime Ministers might be permanently based in Brussels 
and charged with sustaining the authority of the European Council between the six-
monthly summits. This would indeed have called into question the role of the FCO and of 
the Foreign Secretary, especially if, as was mooted at the time, the UK candidate had 
been Peter Mandelson. Proposals to transfer the management (as opposed to the 
coordination and strategic consideration) of European business to the Cabinet Office or to 
Downing Street would have had the same effect.
33 
The FCO has undoubtedly gained from the centralising tendencies that EU 
membership has encouraged and Martin Smith has identified the rise of ‘an informal, yet 
powerful elite comprising Number 10, the FCO, the Cabinet Office and the UK 
permanent representation (UKREP)’
34; a system described by one diplomat in the 
Cabinet Office as the ‘iron triangle’ at the heart of British European policy making.
35 
However the British system of coordination, whilst it gives the FCO by far the major 
role, is also designed to ensure that where necessary the FCO is treated as another 
interested Department and not as the sole determinant of the UK national interest. The 
role of the European Secretariat which arranges, chairs and records the results of 
interdepartmental discussions at all levels
36 ensures that the FCO can not claim sole 
ownership or authorship of EU policy. The Cabinet Office is also responsible for the 
process whereby Parliament is informed and consulted about EU legislation. The FCO is 
usually represented in the European Secretariat, but only with one official in a team of 
about seven – the rest coming from the home civil service. 
However one has to be careful about making too much of the restraints on the 
FCO’s role in EU policy-making and coordination. The European Secretariat is quite 
small, although large by Cabinet Office standards, and it does rely heavily on FCO 
support. Similarly whilst UKREP is indeed an unusual embassy, with more than 50% of 
its staff being drawn from the home civil service, it has always been headed by an 
ambassador from the FCO and the FCO retains the right to oversee its instructions. The 
position of Permanent Representative is an extremely powerful one with the incumbent 
responsible for the day to day management of EU business in Brussels as well as usually   15
playing a pivotal role in Treaty negotiations within the Intergovernmental Conference 
framework
37. The very style of EU negotiations and policy making places the Permanent 
Representative and UKRep into an intensive and ever changing dialogue with London. 
The UK Permanent Representative, additionally gets to return to London each Friday to 
participate in EU policy-making meetings both within the FCO and the Cabinet Office – 
an opportunity resented by some home based officials and envied by some other UK 
ambassadors . 
Thus, despite the constraints mentioned above and elsewhere in this paper, the 
FCO probably has succeeded in retaining a predominant (and not simply a symbolic) EU 
role within the UK system. Because of its competent handling of EU business the FCO 
has earned the respect of, and worked smoothly with, other government departments.
38 It 
has been quite relaxed about allowing other departments to get on with EU business that 
clearly lie within their exclusive competence. The FCO has considered and sensibly 
rejected the idea of charging other departments for the work that its overseas posts carry 
out for them; it has instructed those of its departments, such as European Union 
Department (Internal), who ‘face’ domestic ministries to consult with them about their 
requirements vis-a-vis FCO posts overseas and it has sought to maintain its position, if 
not of supremacy, then at least of ‘primus inter pares’ in the overall direction of British 
foreign policy.  Although Smith argues that ‘as EU business increases, the FCO and the 
Cabinet Office are losing control and departments are increasingly conducting business 
with the Commission and other member states directly’
39 and that the FCO is incorrect in 
its belief that it still controls contact with Brussels, it is the contention of this paper that, 
on the important EU matters, the FCO retains a significant degree of control (the case of 
the Treasury and its control over the issue of the euro is probably now a significant 
exception) and that it is probably wise to not try and take on business that it is beyond 
both its competence and its resources. 
The Labour Government’s devolution policies may well eventually have an 
impact on the way that the UK and FCO relate to the EU, although the Government 
seems determined to try and retain London’s control over these matters.
40 Each of the 
devolved administrations has agreed a concordat with the Westminster Government 
covering their role in international relations in general and the EU in particular. These   16
were agreed without undue difficulty and the arrangements so far seem to be working 
well, although some have noted that this is based mainly on informal cooperation 
between civil servants who remain UK (i.e. not Scottish or Welsh) civil servants. In 
Brussels the regional offices of the devolved assemblies and administrations carry full 
diplomatic accreditation as part of the ‘UKRep family’, and as a result gain access and 
information not afforded to regional offices from other EU Member States (nor is it 
afforded to English regional representations!) The anticipated problems and 
disagreements have not so far materialised, with the result that the FCO has now 
disbanded its short-lived Devolved Administrations Department. Whilst the UK 
government and the FCO are determined to remain officially responsible for international 
relations, including relations with the EU, it may well find itself under pressure from the 
devolved administrations as their work develops. Already there have been suggestions 
that Scotland might seek to expand the level of its separate representation in Brussels
41, 
and it is expected that a Minister from the Scottish Executive will represent the UK in 
fisheries negotiations during the British EU Presidency in 2005. Such moves might 
eventually threaten the role of UKREP and the UK Permanent Representative.   
Comparison with the growing EU role of the German Lander in this context may well be 
instructive in the future. In the long term, of course, the possibility of devolution leading 
to independence would challenge the whole concept of UK foreign policy and the role of 
the UK FCO. 
Within the FCO, following several recent reorganisations, EU matters and 
bilateral relations with individual EU member states are now handled within the same 
Command – the EU Command which now has four departments (CFSP, EU Internal, EU 
External and EU Bilateral) who report to the FCO Director EU and then (except for 
CFSP Dept, who report to the Political Director) to the Director Economic and EU.   
CFSP Department, in effect, provide a secretariat for the FCO Political Director who has 
chief operational responsibility for the UK’s input into the CFSP process. The Wider 
Europe Command brings together all the Departments dealing with Central and Eastern 
Europe (except the Balkans, which has a separate Command) and Western European 
countries which are not in the EU. As a result most elements of European policy have 
now been brought within the same arrangements inside the FCO.   17
The number of FCO staff working or having some contact with EU issues has 
continued to rise as a result of the impact of CFSP, the growing scale of European 
coordination at overseas diplomatic missions and the increased scale of European policy. 
In particular, the European Fast Stream has provided the UK with a constant supply of 
diplomats with an excellent working knowledge of the EU. This has not, however, been 
confined to just the FCO with a large number of civil servants also gaining European 
experience; although it can be argued that, compared with other government departments, 
within the FCO there is a smaller ratio of Europeanists to non-Europeanists. However, 
such is the scale of the ‘Europeanists’ in the FCO that they have been seen to supplant the 
‘Arabists’ in appearing to hold the dominant position in the FCO. This has created 
something of a ‘creative tension’
42 within the FCO, and not gone unnoticed by those who 
regard the FCO as too pro-European. 
However, it is not just euro-sceptics who voice their concerns about the apparent 
imbalance within the FCO towards the EU. Some diplomats from posts beyond the EU 
point to how over 600 diplomats and accredited staff (excluding those at UKRep) work in 
the missions to the EU Member States, while the entire United States lists just around 
200.
43 This in part reflects the growth of ‘mini-Whitehall’ style British diplomatic 
postings, especially to EU member states where domestic, European and international 
affairs merge more so than beyond the EU. This is not to say that overseas missions 
beyond the EU have been immune from Europeanisation. The continuing progress in 
CFSP has resulted in overseas posts holding regular coordinaton meetings with the 
representations of other member States. However, there exist differing levels of   
enthusiasm for such meetings with one senior  British diplomat arguing they were akin to 
a social gathering of most Western allies only notable because of the absence of 
Americans.
44 Some also question the value of holding such EU coordination meetings 
(over 2,000 a year between the EU Missions at the United Nations
45) when this time 
could be better spent lobbying and completing other essential diplomatic work. Others 
argue that the real work is completed by the larger member states such as the UK, France 
and Germany, and in turn cannot be considered as truly representing the whole EU given 
the limited representations of many small EU Member States combined with the 
circumscribed role of the European Commission’s external offices. However, the   18
momentum within the FCO and other Member States diplomatic services towards 
coherent EU diplomatic efforts is aimed at inculcating a natural reflex to work with one 
another and the EU representations. The challenge for the FCO lies in ensuring that this 
does not result in pressure to merge representations. In particular, ideas to create an EU 
Permanent Seat on the UN Security Council have been fiercely resisted by the UK and 
the FCO. 
The growing complexity of the foreign policy agenda has forced the FCO to 
develop more and more functional competences but it has responded to this challenge by 
firmly sticking to an organisational structure that subsumes functional expertise to 
geographical and multilateral Commands and therefore emphasises the importance of the 
FCO’s coordination role in relation to other government departments. This however may 
at last be changing, but within a context where budgetary pressures play as key a role as 
the growing domestic-European linkages. Similarly the FCO, by preserving the pivotal 
role of the ambassador in overseas posts, has resisted the argument that domestic 
specialists who are posted overseas should report directly to their ‘home’ departments.  
Thus, in the name of coherence and consistency, the FCO has successfully defended 
some form of ‘gatekeeper’ role both at home and abroad, even though the participants in 
the foreign policy process are increasingly drawn from a number of non-FCO sources.
46 
Again, this is most clearly seen in the key roles that the FCO and the UK Permanent 
Representation to the EU (UKREP)
47 play in the overall management of British policy 
towards the EU. 
As well as seeking to preserve its central role in Whitehall by improving its links 
with other government departments, the FCO has also had to develop strategies for 
reforming its own internal structure and management practices, partly in response to 
changes in the foreign policy environment including the EU and partly in response to the 
general pressures for governmental reform that have developed in the last decade. The 
FCO approach seems to have been to try and be seen to participate in this process of 
change and reform with as much enthusiasm as possible, whilst preserving its separate 
status and warding off any attempts to downgrade its overall significance by placing 
organisational emphasis on functional rather than geographical and multilateral 
coordination tasks.    19
As mentioned earlier, in 2003 the FCO produced for the first time a Strategy 
Report which maintained a trend to show due significance to the role of the EU but also 
to make it clear that the UK also operated as an independent actor in the wider 
international system. The UK strategy document suggests that whilst the FCO may well 
have been subjected to Europeanisation it is not necessarily either integrating or 
converging with the foreign ministries of the other EU member states. At the same time 
the Strategy Report, while discussing the operation of the FCO, does explore the main 
foreign policy concerns of the United Kingdom, and in this the document shares many 
similarities with the 2003 European Union Security Strategy Document. Both emphasize 
the importance of effective multilateralism tackling problems ranging from international 
terrorism and the spread of WMD through to environmental crises and human rights 
abuses. The two documents would certainly seem to share more similarities than they do 
with the US National Security Strategy document. This in part stems from the strong 
British input to the EU document and again returns us to the idea of Europeanisation 
being a circular process. 
The FCO has revised its mission statement three times in recent years so as to 
relate its corporate objectives more clearly to its core functions and also to facilitate 
better monitoring of those objectives and their attainment. The FCO Annual 
Departmental Report is now replete with lists of objectives and targets with regard to 
political and economic work as well as commercial, consular, entry clearance and 
information work and with records of their achievement. To this end, as well as 
reemphasising, reinforcing and, where appropriate in Europe and South Asia, 
reorganising, its geographic Commands, the FCO has also sought to implement a policy 
of devolving both financial and management responsibility down through Commands to  
departments and to overseas posts in line with similar developments elsewhere in the 
government service.. The FCO has sought over time to remove a complete layer of senior 
management (DUS level) by making geographic Commands directly answerable to the 
PUS and to give more responsibility at departmental level to officials, by encouraging 
them to brief ministers directly rather than moving documents through several layers of 
authorisation and control.  Attempts have also been made to improve the role of policy 
planning in the FCO (partly in association with other EU foreign ministries), to better    20
associate the work of the Research Analysts with their customer departments and to 
reorganise the management structure so that those responsible for policy planning and 
advice and those responsible for the management of resources are more closely 
associated with each others work. This latter objective has been partly achieved by 
devolution and partly by unifying the Policy Advisory Board and the Board of 
Management and strengthening their links with the Commands as well as their ‘visibility’ 
to the rest of the FCO. A number of these reforms can be tracked around the Foreign 
Ministries of the other EU member states but whether this can be described as 
europeanization, adaptation, emulation or policy transfer is a debatable point. 
Changes in British society and in the approach to work and working conditions 
have forced the FCO to reconsider the way that it recruits staff and carries out its 
business. Attempts to open up the recruitment process have had mixed results; whilst the 
FCO can point to figures that suggest a steady increase in the employment of women
48 
and in the decline of candidates from private schools, its record on the employment of 
representatives of ethnic minorities is not impressive and it attracted highly unfavorable 
publicity in January of 1996 when its most senior woman, Pauline Neville-Jones, 
resigned ‘noisily’ after being denied the position of ambassador to Paris, on the face of it 
because she was both female and unmarried even though there have been women 
ambassadors in several countries, eg Denmark, Ireland, Netherlands, Chile and South 
Africa. On a variety of staff matters the FCO is increasingly in competition with a 
number of other employers for the talents of the young high flyers that it used to recruit 
with ease.  Relatively poor pay, poor conditions of service, long working hours, slim 
chances of rapid promotion in a service where a number of senior posts have been cut on 
efficiency and  economy grounds have all taken their toll and the FCO has been relatively 
slow to respond, leading to reports of  growing dissatisfaction and low morale.
49 Whether 
a Labour Government intent on ‘opening up’ the FCO to a wider recruitment base and 
more open and modern working practices
50 is likely to restore the once high morale of the 
Diplomatic Service remains to be seen. Many of the most unpopular changes to the 
nature of the work, and thus to the prospects of a satisfactory career, have been driven by 
the constant need to find financial savings rather than by the nature of the work. As Sir 
Michael Jay, Permanent Under Secretary, noted in the ‘FCO Connect’ Report of October   21
2003, ‘The FCO is over-extended… the resourcing of our network has now fallen below 
the minimum levels to enable us to do our job.’
51 It does not seem very likely that this 
pressure will be significantly eased in the foreseeable future and so the FCO will continue 
to be disabled in its efforts to create a modern service capable of attracting and retaining 
high quality staff.
52 This may well force the FCO in the future to give much more serious 
consideration to moves within the EU to create a European diplomatic service involving  
both Commission and Council officials and those from EU national diplomatic services.
53  
Indeed, one area of possible change/adjustment which previous governments have 
resisted, concerns developments in the EU and the institutional consequences of pursuing 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy. The British government, despite finding it 
increasingly difficult to devote the necessary resources to its foreign policy machine, has 
not been tempted by the European option of pooling resources particularly those overseas 
although Britain and France have recently (outside the EU framework) announced plans 
to work more closely together in Africa.
54 Proposals to establish joint EU embassies
55 and 
eventually to establish a full blown European diplomatic service have been stoutly 
resisted by Britain in favour of retaining a national foreign ministry and diplomatic 
service, even though, recently, Britain has gone along with an increasing concentration of 
CFSP activity in Brussels 
56. In keeping with this approach, in March of 1999
57, the 
Foreign Secretary proposed the establishment of a permanent committee of deputy 
political directors in Brussels to steer and reinforce the CFSP. The idea of this committee 
was clearly to keep control of the CFSP firmly in the hands of national foreign ministries 
by boosting the Council of Ministers and the Council Secretariat rather than enhancing 
the Commission’s external powers. This British proposal led in time to the creation of the 
Political and Security Committee which is a good example of what has been described as  
the ‘Brusselsisation’ of the CFSP process. This is also a good example of the circular 
nature of Europeanization as the FCO having advocated the establishment in Brussels of 
something like the COPS now has to adjust to its existence! 
Another area where the FCO has been forced to respond to change in recent years 
concerns the growing interest of the wider public, both at home and abroad, in foreign 
policy. Domestic publics, particularly in the developed world and, particularly of late 
within the EU member states, are now less trusting of governments and more aware of   22
what they are up to in the foreign policy area. Britain is no exception to this general post-
war trend which has, if anything, accelerated since the end of the cold war. The FCO 
must now pay more attention to both Parliament and the wider public in Britain whilst the 
state of public opinion in those countries which Britain seeks to influence is now also a 
factor that needs to be given far more attention than in the past. Recent meetings of the 
European Council and the last three IGCs have been notable for the concern of individual 
European leaders for public opinion and reaction back home. The FCO can be criticised 
for being slow to react to this phenomenon. Commentators noted the persistent refusal of 
the FCO to either acknowledge or seek to reach a consensus with the significant 
‘Falklands lobby’
58 which nevertheless exerted influence on British attempts to change  
its policy on the ownership of the Falkland Islands  and the FCO and the British 
government in general can be faulted for their failure to seek a  broad domestic consensus 
on a whole host of European Union issues. Similarly the FCO was heavily criticised for 
its recent attempts to cut the budget and restrict the activities of both the BBC World 
Service
59 and the British Council at a time when the importance of this type of ‘public 
diplomacy’ was becoming more rather than less significant.  The FCO and the UK 
government in general continue to struggle to find a way of creating a domestic 
consensus for the EU policies that they wish to pursue and the EU structures that they 
wish to support. 
However, the issue of public diplomacy has now begun to be addressed by the 
FCO. The Fundamental Expenditure Review devoted a whole section to the growing 
importance of public diplomacy and to the need for the FCO to develop a public 
diplomacy strategy statement as well as individual country strategies.  The BBC World 
Service and the British Council are to have their objectives reevaluated with a view to 
aligning them more closely to the FCO’s aims and objectives and the FCO Information 
and Cultural Relations Departments have been restructured. The FCO now has a Public 
Diplomacy Dept and EUD(I) a Public Diplomacy Section.  At a recent seminar of all the 
UK’s present and former ambassadors to the EU, the present incumbent and his 
immediate predecessor both commented on their changing roles with  much less time 
being spent in COREPER and much more time being spent on more traditional 
ambassadorial work with interest groups and members of the EP. At the same time, as   23
noted above, the increased demands of European co-operation at embassies abroad has 
been seen to detract from the amount of time available for other work, including public 
diplomacy.  
  It is easy to forget that overseas diplomatic missions also cater to the needs of 
national citizens residing or visiting overseas, a situation that with the growing number of 
tourists and ease of working abroad (especially within the EU) has placed considerable 
pressures on the FCO and overseas missions. As already noted, such financial pressures 
have already led to EU Member States sharing diplomatic assets and support. Perhaps the 
most significant challenge today for overseas posts is dealing with the threat of another 
attack such as that of 11 September 2001. For the UK and the FCO, the experience of 
handling the crisis 9/11 was almost entirely British in outlook and learning. This mainly 
stemmed from New York being the one city in the world where every nation state has at 
least some form of diplomatic representation and therefore some means of dealing with 
its nationals in that city when the emergency occurred. The experiences of the British 
Consulate in New York essentially helped to write the guidelines on how to deal with 
future such atrocities. Dealing with incidents such as Bali or Istanbul have brought into 
the equation the opportunities for help and assistance from other EU member states.  
Europe, Downing Street and the FCO 
 
No discussion of the growing impact of the EU on the FCO would be complete 
without discussion of the growing role played in European and foreign policy by the 
Prime Minister and Downing Street. The movement of the European and Overseas and 
Defence Secretariats from the Cabinet Office to Downing Street has ratcheted up the role 
played by the PM. This in part reflects the interest shown by the current Prime Minister 
in foreign affairs and his ‘presidential style’. At the same time it also stems from much 
longer term patterns such as the growing number and importance of EU summits, in 
particular those of the European Council. For the FCO this has brought mixed results. It 
has produced a Prime Minister who has dedicated a considerable amount of time to the 
field of foreign policy in turn providing the UK with an international statesman. At the 
same time it has apparently sidelined an FCO that the Prime Minister does not consider to 
be staffed by ‘his people’.
60 There have been repeated complaints of the FCO being   24
sidelined from policy making on issues such as Iraq, the EU constitution, relations with 
Washington and world leaders and the general overall strategy and justifications behind 
British foreign policy.
61 The problem being that the perceived need for overall strategy 
from Downing Street has provided an impetus to give direction but in turn fail to address 
the detail of such issues as post-war reconstruction in Iraq or certain loopholes in the EU 
constitution. The letter to the Financial Times in May 2004 from 52 retired British 
diplomats attacking the Prime Minster’s position in the Middle East was the most visible 
sign of such discontent.  
In part the increased involvement of the PM in European policy also stems from 
his attempts to tackle British euro-scepticism and broaden the nature of the UK 
government’s relationship with its EU partners.
62 These too may challenge the role of the 
FCO in the future. The Prime Minister has long been keen to establish stronger links 
between the centre-left parties in power in a number of the 15 EU states although in 
recent years their number has declined and Mr Blair’s willingness to develop bilateral 
relationships with almost anybody regardless of political stance has increased. For a brief 
period Mr Blair appointed Mr Mandelson, seemingly with the then Foreign Secretary 
Robin Cook’s blessing, to act as a ‘roving ambassador’ but this did not appear to last long 
or bear much fruit. 
For his part Mr Cook when Foreign Secretary set up a powerful committee to 
increase the Labour party’s influence in Europe
63. The committee, which is chaired by 
the Minister for Europe included policy advisors from Downing Street, the FCO and the 
Treasury. It represents the kind of development that the FCO has to embrace but, one 
suspects, with the intention of smothering rather than nurturing a potential challenger to 
its control of UK relations with European governments. The idea of someone like Mr 
Mandelson becoming a ‘roving European Ambassador’ was about as pleasing to the 
mandarins within the FCO as the idea of a foreign policy unit in Downing Street or a 
Minister for Europe in the Cabinet Office.  
 
Conclusions 
   25
As we have seen throughout, the key problem when examining the FCO rests in it 
operating at the national, European and international levels. It is not easy to discern a 
process of Europeanisation against such a background and it is therefore necessary to 
view Europeanisation as one key element of the context and pressures to which the FCO 
has been adapting over the past 60 years. The main challenge brought about has been 
with foreign and European policy increasingly becoming issues of coordination across 
government, with the FCO striving to remain a [the] central department in this process.  
At the same time the FCO has been keen to maintain its own separate identity and 
interests such as its so far successful defense of a separate Diplomatic Service, a position 
endorsed by the 1994 White Paper on the Civil Service which stated that “The 
Diplomatic Service is a separate branch of the public service with its own particular 
needs and structure.”
64  
The areas where Europeanisation has played a part include: the structure of the 
FCO in terms of both the Political Director and the PUS; the management of desks for 
EU member states and the growing importance of the European command; the growth in 
the role of UKRep and other ‘mini-Whitehalls’; the increased prominence of 
‘Europeanists’ and the European dimension to the budgetary and personnel challenges; 
the EU coordination work in overseas posts; the more prominent role played by the PM 
and Downing Street; and finally the approach the FCO has taken to the development of 
CFSP. Such developments have not occurred overnight but have been a process 
stretching over decades. Indeed, it is essential to recall that the FCO has played a central 
role in how the UK has approached European integration since before the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome. In response the FCO has generally developed responses that resemble 
‘fine-tuning’ rather than radical reform but they have enabled the FCO and the 
Diplomatic Service to retain their central position in the making and implementation of 
British foreign policy. Indeed it has been argued that EU membership has provided 
opportunities for the FCO, along with the DTI and MAFF/DEFRA to ‘increase their role 
and autonomy.’
65 
The FCO has responded reasonably well to change whether the stimulus comes 
from within the UK, from Europe or from the wider international system. As we noted 
above, its basic tactic has been to strongly resist all attempts to impose reform from   26
outside, whilst internally making some quite radical adjustments to the way that it 
organises itself and carries out its work. The changes in the substance of foreign policy 
and the blurring of boundaries between foreign and domestic policy have forced the FCO 
to work much more closely with other government departments, both within Britain and 
abroad, and to organise itself for the demands of multilateral (of which the EU is the most 
significant) as well as bilateral diplomacy and negotiation. In this sense Europeanisation 
has ended the idea that the FCO can play the role of a gatekeeper through which all 
contact with the outside world must flow. Such a role is now impossible, and the FCO, 
and the rest of Whitehall, accept that such a role is no longer plausible. However, the 
FCO remains the central department for monitoring, managing and, with Downing St and 
the Cabinet Office, coordinating the direction of British European and foreign policy. In 
this sense the EU has redefined the role of gatekeeper.  
All in all the FCO, as a collective entity, has been neither a winner nor a loser 
from Europeanisation. For the FCO is has been given a greater field into which to 
become engaged while at the same time facing burgeoning pressures in terms of financial 
limits, global problems, and domestic shifts, which are in part also fed by European 
pressures. It has both strengthened and weakened the foreign policy of the UK, and at the 
same time strengthened and weakened the role played by the FCO. If there is an element 
of decline in the input of the FCO to relations with EU member states then this is better 
understood as relative decline given the growth in issues that now form relations and 
discussions. 
As if to reflect the diverse levels at which the FCO operates and the wide variety 
of offices and outlooks, there is no single process by which Europeanisation has 
occurred. Top-down Europeanisation can apply to the position of the Political Director or 
the demand that Member States overseas diplomatic representations increase co-
ordination. Indeed, it remains to be seen whether the decision to create a European 
Foreign Minister will bring considerable top-down pressures for greater co-operation. At 
the same time the UK and the FCO have been involved in EPC and now CFSP since the 
very start (unlike European integration in general) and have succeeded in 
uploading/domesticating British concerns at EU level. That the EU Security Strategy 
Document reflected British concerns was in part a result of it being written by the British   27
diplomat (and former advisor to the PM) Robert Cooper, perhaps the best example of a 
Europeanised British diplomat. Indeed, British attempts to shape EU external relations 
have been a key element of British membership and transatlantic relations. Here though 
we again see the limits in Europeanisation as we must also account for the role of Nato 
and the United States. Indeed, the role of the United States has been central to British 
and, to some extent, FCO, approaches to CFSP and the EU; perhaps in turn diminishing 
any arguments that Europeanisation of the FCO has been ‘voluntary’!  
There is one final effect of Europeanisation which deserves mention. This paper 
has raised some questions about the ability and willingness of the FCO to adjust to the 
general challenge of a transformed world and the specific challenge of EU membership. 
One conclusion would seem be that, whilst the FCO has undoubtedly proved itself to be a 
foreign ministry capable of both responsiveness and flexibility (although Peter Hain MP 
when an FCO Minister talked of his ‘frustration that the (FCO) machine is geared to 
responding to new circumstances mostly by incremental shifts in emphasis’
66), it has yet 
to be fully tested by, or called upon to serve, a government willing to adopt a   
consistently proactive EU policy. If the Labour administration is to actively pursue the 
objectives, laid out in Robin Cook’s mission statement,
67 of ‘exercising leadership in the 
European Union, protecting the world’s environment, countering the menace of drugs, 
terrorism and crime, spreading the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy 
and using its status at the UN to secure more effective international action to keep the 
peace of the world and to combat poverty’ then the FCO just might find its organisation 
and working practices more fundamentally tested than it has to date.  
  The FCO was once described as being akin to a ‘Rolls Royce’. Indeed, it remains 
a traditional, debonair (some might say pompous) and highly effective instrument and 
symbol of the British state and British power. In part this stems from European 
cooperation and the changes the FCO has adopted in part as a response to the EU. Indeed, 
like Rolls Royce, which is now owned by BMW, the FCO owes a large part of its current 
and future success to continuing investment in European cooperation. 
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